Kidnapped Girls and a Besieged Church: Conflicting Details

Coptic Protestors Block Road in Minya

Issues of sectarian tension in Upper Egypt create a double problem in establishing fact. First, many news agencies do not commit resources to the area, so journalism often relies on hearsay rather than first-hand reporting. Second, religious biases often serve to either cover over or amplify aspects of the story that play into an established narrative. This is true both among those involved and in the reporters themselves, as rumors are easily conflated into facts.

In the last week the governorate of Minya in Upper Egypt witnessed two examples of Muslim-Christian tension. Unfortunately, these incidents often go unreported in major media outlets, and within Egypt often receive scant coverage as well. This is seen in the brevity of two reports in al-Masry al Youm, English edition, which also serve to establish the basic facts.

In the first report, clashes are reported between Copts and the police, when the former attempted to block a road in protest of two local girls who were rumored to have been kidnapped and forced to convert to Islam.

In the second report, the police this time disperse hundreds of Muslims surrounding a church in Beni Ahmad village in the governorate of Minya. They were protesting the reinstatement of a priest who had been previously removed by agreement of the church and authorities, allegedly for inciting sectarian tension.

With the dearth of first-hand, in-depth reporting, however, comes coverage that often relies on one-sided sources, promoting a cause with lack of objectivity. Whereas the lack of coverage can be interpreted as complicit silence against Coptic grievances, this latter reporting is wholesale adoption of their perspective. Indicative are these two articles from the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA), which tells these stories, and others as well.

These articles rely on statements taken from the area, and do a good job of increasing the level of detail.

In the first report, the two Coptic girls are identified as Christine Azat (age 16) and Nancy Magdi (age 14). These were reportedly abducted on June 12 while on their way to church. The article quotes Christine’s father, and describes how the Christians of the area have scrambled to assemble the 200,000 LE ($33,333 US) ransom demanded for their release. Once done, however, they were rebuffed saying the girls were already sold to another group, which was now demanding twelve million LE (two million USD) to hand them over. The article mentions the rumor that they ran away and willingly embraced Islam, but dismisses this as the Azhar rejects underage conversions.

In the second report, the village of Beni Ahmad West is located seven kilometers south of Minya. The conflict relates to an incident from March 23rd, 2011, in which Muslims surrounded St. George Church and threatened to destroy it when licensed renovation appeared to be expanding the building. Eyewitnesses are quoted saying the Muslims chanted they would kill the priest, Fr. George Thabit, for his role in events if he and his family did not leave the village. In a previous article AINA states there are 23,000 Muslims and 8,000 Christians resident in the village.

The report states that Fr. George did leave the village. Muslims, however, heard rumors he would be returning, and began to camp out at the church in small numbers. When he did come back, on June 24 there was another major demonstration against him. Five hours later he was escorted away in a police vehicle. The Muslims remained until security later dispersed them. The archbishopric is quoted as condemning this interference in ecclesiastic affairs, asking for the rule of law and maintenance of security.

The information above is fair enough, but it is couched in language that betrays bias. For example, the report about the two girls ends with the speculation that, “as females, their lot is to be raped, enslaved, and sold off to some rich, sexually-depraved man who believes it his divine right to own infidel sex-slaves.” The second report does not have such blatant speculation, but ends with communication of a non-identified threat from the Muslim ‘mob’, that unless they hear that, “the priest is banned from returning to the village, they will hold their Friday prayers tomorrow, June 24, inside St. George’s church.”

If indeed this is the story, it is important to relate it as such. Given the sensitive reality of sectarian tension, however, it is vital to either consult contrary sources or else convey the story with appropriate doubt. The English language Ahram Online web newspaper provides alternate coverage of the kidnapped girls.

This article places both girls’ ages at 14, and states they ran away from home months ago, with their families searching for them frantically. A policeman discovered them walking on the streets, conspicuous with their face veil but with the tattoo of a cross on their wrists. The article states the girls have produced a YouTube video stating their voluntary conversion to Islam, and that they were not kidnapped. It states they are being held in a safe house until an Azhar scholar can determine if the story of their conversion is true. Meanwhile, the families of the girls have asked that they be returned home.

It should be noted that Ahram Online is a government owned newspaper. Though it has appeared to have more freedom to criticize the government than its printed counterpart, al-Ahram, the story must still be understood in light of its ownership reality.

Arab West Report was able to contact Nermine Rida, a Coptic Orthodox journalist for Akhbar al-Minya. She stated the girls were involved in a teenage crush with two Muslims, Ali Gomaa Rashid and his relative Ezzat Gomaa Rashid. These along with another relative, Saudi Gomaa Rashid, were currently being held in custody, along with five Copts still detained for their role in the demonstrations. Rida stated that Copts transgressed the acceptable levels of peaceful demonstration by blocking the road, and that the police were justified in breaking up their protest.

Rida also stated that the Azhar rejected the girls’ conversion to Islam since the law does not allow for  the conversion of anyone under eighteen years of age. She did watch the YouTube video, however, and was convinced the girls were not kidnapped and made the video without compulsion. She understood that they were being held currently by authorities, but were soon due to return to their homes.

Rida was unable to confirm the ransom demand, except to say a call to raise 200,000 LE was issued by a Christian satellite channel, al-Tariq.

Concerning the incident in Beni Ahmad village, Rida confirmed the outlines of the story centering around Muslim demonstrations and Fr. George Thabit. There was a disagreement about the dimensions of the church and the role played by Fr. George, resulting in an agreement with Bishop Arsanius of Minya to send him away. During his absence from the village the church was repaired satisfactorily along the lines agreed upon by all village members.

After completion, the bishop returned Fr. George to the village, and Muslims were angered and resumed their demonstration. Yet Rida makes clear Muslims were not the only party in disagreement with his decision. Around thirty Copts joined the Muslims in demonstrating against the return of Fr. George, headed by one named Rifaat al-Qummus.

Arab West Report is unable to independently verify the account of Nermine Rida.

What should be made of these situations, then? Without traveling to the area and investigating directly, one should be cautious about claiming certainty about events. Even then, one would be likely to discover contradictory testimony.

Kidnappings regardless of religion have taken place in Egypt within the security vacuum since the revolution. Many Copts, however, believe their community is especially targeted by extremist Muslims. Yet it is also clear that at times Copts respond with accusations of kidnapping when facing the shame of a female relative running away from home, either due to a bad family situation or in a love affair with a Muslim.

One of the issues lies in the definition of kidnapping. Generally understood, kidnapping involves the use of physical force in an abduction. Some Copts, however, expand the meaning to include the luring away of adolescent women from their family, helping (or deceiving) her to escape from difficult domestic situations. Cornelis Hulsman of Arab West Report has written extensively on this issue.[1]

Camilia Shehata represents the most recent example of an imagined kidnapping, which captured the attention of the nation. Frustrated by her marital situation, she ran away and disappeared for four days. Local Copts immediately began demonstrating demanding her return from her assumed Muslim captors.

Muslims, meanwhile, circulated pictures in which she was wearing a hijab, and claimed Copts had kidnapped her – a willing convert to Islam – holding her in a church or monastery. Salafi Muslims held rallies in her defense, and some threatened to storm the monasteries in search of their ‘sister’. Immediately on the heels of this story followed the case of Abeer Talaat, which culminated in the horrors of Imbaba when Muslims tried to enter the church upon a rumor she was captive there, held apart from her Muslim husband.  The ensuing clash resulted in multiple deaths and the burning of a nearby church with no connection to the rumor.

One day before the Imbaba incident, Camilia Shehata appeared on al-Hayat Christian satellite channel and told the truth of her story. She sat with her husband and child, and confessed to running away from home, due to marital issues. She never converted to Islam, however, and she was sorry for the trouble caused.

In terms of church building issues, it is well known that Christians have had difficulty securing permits. During the Mubarak era, decision-making power was held by the security apparatus, which often decided upon granting or withholding permits due to the perceived reception of Muslims in the area. There is currently a new, draft, unified law for building houses of worship, to govern both churches and mosques on an administrative basis. The first draft has been rejected by the churches of Egypt, in part due to the perception the locus of decision will not move from security.

This issue is similar to a church building conflict in Ezbet Bushra from June 2009, in the governorate of Beni Suef. In this location Fr. Ishaq Kastour was involved in a controversy in which Copts built a factory which was actually purposed to become a church, which included a place for his personal residence. The process was done without approval, and Muslims vandalized the building at various stages. Fr. Ishaq was also removed from the village by the bishop (presumably at the urging of the security apparatus), returned, but was eventually permanently assigned elsewhere. A government sponsored Muslim-Christian reconciliation meeting led to the decision to grant Copts a church building, but on the outskirts of the village, as a hastily constructed mosque was given preference at the original location. As of the completion of an AWR report on the subject, authorization of the church had not yet been granted.

It also is not uncommon for parishioners to disagree about their church leadership. The Coptic Orthodox Church is a hierarchical organization which appoints priests to their diocese. While local sentiment can be and often is taken into consideration, it is not unheard of for a small but active contingent of a congregation to reject their given priest. According to Rida’s report, only thirty Copts participated in the protest against Fr. George. Was this a contingent of malcontents, or indicative of widespread frustration with his leadership? In any event, it would be improper to label the demonstration strictly as Muslim transgression in church affairs.

None of this explanation should be used to justify the parameters of the two stories, but will hopefully make actions more understandable. The girls may have been kidnapped or not, but if not, surely most demonstrators did not know the truth of the situation. It is the case in Egypt, and certainly since the revolution, that the best way to achieve results is to gather masses of people and pressure authorities to grant your demands. In the face of perceived official neglect of Coptic issues, including other cases of alleged kidnapped girls, the demonstration on the part of most was in imitation of other groups’ success.

Should this be necessary? No. Should underage girls have been immediately returned to their family? Yes. Should Copts have blocked roads and resisted dismissal? No. Have there been real cases of kidnapping Coptic adolescents? Perhaps.  Is there blame, when in occurrence, on those who quickly circulate false or unsubstantiated claims of kidnapping? Absolutely.

What is the reality of this case? It is not altogether clear.

Similarly, Muslims have used the power of demonstration to great success in pressuring government to yield to their will. This was seen most recently in the case of the appointed Coptic governor of Qena. Initial demonstrations against him were joined by Copts, in protest of the previous Coptic governor’s poor record and the newly appointed governor’s alleged role in killing protestors during the revolution. Yet the demonstrations against him quickly took on a religious dimension, as area Salafis, and some Muslim Brothers, rejected the idea of having a non-Muslim governor altogether. They blocked roads and threatened to cut off supply lines to popular tourist areas to the east on the Red Sea coast. The government was unable to dislodge them, and a solution was crafted in which the governor was ‘suspended’ for three months. When he left the area, the demonstrations subsided.

Were the Muslims of Beni Ahmad looking to similarly assert their will against a rejected priest? Perhaps. Was the conduct of this priest deserving of their rejection? It is not known. Is it the reality of Upper Egypt that decisions are taken communally rather than through the rule of law? Yes. Is this an acceptable way to govern a nation? No. Is it right for the priest to be removed in this way? No.

What is the reality of this case? It is not altogether clear.

What is clear is the poor, partisan, and inflammatory reporting of these incidents by the Assyrian International News Agency. Whereas AINA did an admirable job of presenting a perspective of these events, when much mainstream reporting is either in ignorance or dismissive of its importance, they failed to present other sides of the issue. Furthermore, amidst this negligence, they assumed the total credibility of the reported Coptic position, in doing so warping the perspective of their readership.

Sectarian issues do not plague Egypt, but they are a significant social problem. Underlying them is an unspoken frustration with the ‘other’, as competing storylines place explanation of these incidents into a greater narrative. Depending on perspective, they are either aberrations in a centuries-long culture of tolerance, or else a disturbing confirmation of pervasive discrimination.

Greater narratives, however, smooth over details. Each individual sectarian incident has its own details, many of which are disputed or unknown. Reporting of these events must take utmost care to prevent their automatic assumption into a narrative. At the same time, reporting must call a spade a spade, when this is clear.

Such clarity is difficult to achieve. With sectarian conflict, both metaphorically and literally, the devil is in the details.

[1] Cornelis Hulsman, “Forced Conversions or not?”, report presented to the New York Council of Churches, June 28, 1999 [RNSAW, 1999, week 26A, art. 37], http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/2126

Rodolph Yanney, “Conversions of Christians to Islam,” January 9, 2001 [RNSAW, 2001, week 01A, art. 4] http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/4251

Cornelis Hulsman, “Open letter to former US Congressman Pastor Ed McNeely for writing President Bush a letter with wrong claims about Christian girls being kidnapped by Muslims,” AWR, 2003, week 30, art. 34, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/11472

Cornelis Hulsman, Usāmah W. al-Ahwānī, Sawsan Jabrah and Nirmīn Fawzī, Was converted girl kidnapped? AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 21, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/16317

Usāmah Wadīc al-Ahwānī, Christian girl Ingy became a member of a Muslim Family, AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 22, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/6372

AWR editorial board, “Western misreporting on Ingy’s conversion to Islam,” AWR, 2004, week 28, art. 38, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/6361

Cornelis Hulsman, Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt; opinions from Egyptians in various positions, AWR, 2004, week 38, art. 28, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/7698 (with a comment of rev. Menes Abdel Nour about the alleged kidnap of Injī Edward Nājī)

Janique Blattmann, Christian Solidarity International claiming forced conversion of Coptic girls to Islam, AWR, 2005, week 53, art. 8, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/12409

Sara Aguzzoni, Media reports of Christians converting to Islam, Arab-West Papers no. 6, August 2008, http://www.arabwestreport.info/node/27517

Published in: on June 30, 2011 at 6:43 pm  Leave a Comment  
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America Accused of Promoting Sectarian Tension

Yahia al-Gamal

Today, the Deputy Prime Minister, Yahia al-Gamal, publically accused the United States and Israel of fermenting sectarian tension in Egypt. This was on the heels of a similar statement made by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Though it was not their only commenton the matter, which included introspection and self-critique, it continues a path of blaming outside forces, particularly the discredited Israelis.

That the United States was named was particularly surprising to me. On the one hand, the US is still a primary benefactor of Egypt. On the other, as an American, it is difficult to imagine my nation involved in such evil. I can imagine our international pressure, our use of spies, even our meddling in governments and coup d’etats. Such examples are well documented in history.

As a nation we like to believe in our goodness, and I believe that at base this is not a lie. Yet we should not be deceived that our primary motivation, like that of all nations, is for our interest. While pursuit of self-interest is not necessarily evil, it is sub-good. Morality demands the pursuit of the interest of others, along with self.

I discovered a very interesting article today about US history in Syria. Today there is near universal condemnation of the regime, although, in an indirect way, the US had a hand in creating what now exists. The story goes back to 1947, and has stunning old interview footage with Americans who had a hand in ‘democracy promotion’. Here is an excerpt for the article to introduce the subject:

What is happening in Syria feels like one of the last gasps of the age of the military dictators. An old way of running the world is still desperately trying to cling to power, but the underlying feeling in the west is that somehow Assad’s archaic and cruel military rule will inevitably collapse and Syrians will move forward into a democratic age.

That may, or may not, happen, but what is extraordinary is that we have been here before. Between 1947 and 1949 an odd group of idealists and hard realists in the American government set out to intervene in Syria. Their aim was to liberate the Syrian people from a corrupt autocratic elite – and allow true democracy to flourish. They did this because they were convinced that “the Syrian people are naturally democratic” and that all that was necessary was to get rid of the elites – and a new world of “peace and progress” would inevitably emerge.

What resulted was a disaster, and the consequences of that disaster then led, through a weird series of bloody twists and turns, to the rise to power of the Assad family and the widescale repression in Syria today.

I thought I would tell that story.

Click here to read it.

What strikes me at the start of the story is the innocence of the American effort. From appearances, we really were trying to help. As our attempts stalled, however, our interference became more and more direct, until we alienated the population altogether. Development of the Syrian autocracy lies in their own hands, but the United States gave a good, inadvertent jump start to the process.

Conspiracies abound in this part of the world, and while I usually do my best to consider the purported reality behind each one, I cannot bring myself to make sense of how the US profits if Muslims and Christians are killing each other in Egypt. Perhaps I am unwilling to. Less biased readers are invited to fill in the story in the comments.

What we should never do, however, is doubt our own potential for evil. Small moral compromises – even for the sake of good – can easily lead to greater and greater sins. I also believe the maxim to be true: Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The power of the United States is not absolute, certainly not in Egypt. Yet if we do not consider our own corruption, we are helpless to prevent its occurrence.

Today, one friend explained the comment from the Armed Forces as indicative of their frustration that the United States is now speaking directly to groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. During the days of Mubarak, the government kept a monopoly on international communication. ‘Manipulation of Islamist groups’, as stated, can simply mean this.

Or it could mean more. I would hope the comments of the deputy prime minister are only a rhetorical play to his audience. Politicians the world over can make exaggerated statements for effect, serving whatever interests they believe fitting. It was not too long ago that Islamist groups called for the dismissal of al-Gamal, due to his supposed anti-Islamist viewpoints. Maybe he is mending fences.

The point is, we do not know. We have many historic national sins; we may have unknown present ones. I doubt the accusation is true. I hope the accusation is not true. Please, may the accusation not be true.

Published in: on June 27, 2011 at 8:26 pm  Comments (1)  
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Could Imbaba Happen in Maadi?

An upscale home in Maadi

It used to seem that sectarian conflict occurred in distant regions of Egypt, mostly centered in the traditional towns of the south. In recent years these have been creeping closer and closer to Cairo, though still isolated mainly in poorer, fragmented neighborhoods which maintain a traditional Upper Egyptian mentality. Yet the question is fair: Is the trend indicative, and may such incidents affect even the cosmopolitan areas?

My family and I live in the neighborhood of Maadi, a southern suburb of Cairo which has always been and remains an upper class enclave, populated by many foreign residents. Muslims and Christians living here are well-off, well-educated, and lament any hint that the two religions cannot get along. Furthermore, safeguarding the economic interests of the community, police presence is strong, crime is minimal, and life is a level above the struggles faced in other areas of the city.

Yet our home lies somewhat on the border of a lower to middle class neighborhood called Hadayak al-Maadi. Literally translated ‘the gardens of Maadi’, there is little greenery to be seen at all, in contradistinction to the grassy circles and plentiful trees slightly south in Maadi proper. We do much of our shopping here, finding prices to be lower than in the import-focused markets of Maadi elites. We also enjoy the descent into what feels like ‘real Egypt’, though our populist notions might be dismissed by the suggestion of living there. People, however, have always been friendly, and we do not feel out of place.

Yet if a sectarian conflict were to envelop Maadi, Hadayak might seem like more fertile ground for it to begin. Despite our ventures into the area, we don’t know it well. Do Muslims and Christians get along? Are they neighbors and friends, or does each community tend to itself? I approached Fr. Arsanius, one of two priests serving at the Coptic Orthodox Church of Abu Sayfain. This church is about a fifteen minute walk from our home, located in the heart of the Hadayak area.

Relations are good here, he assures. He would not expect a sectarian conflict to arise in the neighborhood. His answer in elaboration, however, is not only nuanced, it is near contradictory.

Approximately 2,200 Christian families live in the area, and these enjoy good relations with their neighbors. In this part of town everyone knows everyone else, which confidently leads Fr. Arsanius to state there are no ‘thugs’ in Hadayak. In recent sectarian conflict in other parts of Egypt, thugs have borne the brunt of condemnation, along with Salafi Muslims of extremist ideology. Accusations continue in that the thugs in question have been brought from elsewhere to attack an area. There is nothing to be done about this, Fr. Arsanius states, but local relations would not yield to it. Furthermore, in terms of Salafis, he has seen a few resident in Hadayak, but they have no centers of activity here, and illustrate no evidence of violence.

Directly across the street from the church is the Maghfara (Forgiveness) Mosque. After the Alexandria church bombing on New Year’s Eve, one week later on Coptic Christmas local Muslims encircled the church, and several went inside during the service to express solidarity with their Christian brothers. Then, during the days of revolution the imam called publically for Muslims to protect the church, calling it ‘our church’. A few days after Mubarak stepped down, the mosque organized public speeches in celebration, to which he invited Fr. Mercurious of the church to also address the crowd. For its part, the church organized a local garbage clean-up effort; young Christians went to the mosque and asked for assistance, and many Muslim youth joined in.

Yet despite the sincere and appreciative words of Fr. Arsanius, he also expresses concern about the mosque, beginning from its very inception. Abu Sayfain Church was built in 2001, along the pattern of many church construction projects in Egypt. A local Christian owned land and in coordination with church authorities began constructing a house of worship. He did not bother seeking prior permission, as many Christians believe this is an endless process leading nowhere. The effort did not meet resistance, however, and since then the church has been fully functioning. It is currently seeking funds to construct a service building on the plot of land next to the church, hopefully to house a small medical clinic among other activities.

While the construction did not meet opposition, it did engender competition. The land across the street from the church was owned by a Muslim with Muslim Brotherhood sympathies. During this time the Muslim Brotherhood was an outlawed, but tolerated, group. Similarly, it was unable to build houses of worship through official channels. Building a mosque in general, however, is easy. It was constructed under the supervision of the officially registered NGO al-Gama’iyya al-Shara’iyya (the Religiously Legitimate Association), which some accuse of promoting Islamist ideology. This NGO is nationwide, controlling hundreds if not thousands of mosques, and operating charitable service centers. While a good number of the mosque imams would be under the supervision also of the government, ensuring moderate interpretations of Islam, Fr. Arsanius did not know if the imam here was so linked.

He did know, however, the centrality of the mosque in Hadayak Muslim Brotherhood activity. While some understand the post-revolution Muslim Brotherhood to be a centrist political organization working for a civil state, albeit with an Islamic reference, Fr. Arsanius disagreed. Yes, some of their members present a moderate, even liberal vision. Others, including important leadership, call for full implementation of sharia law, an Islamic state, and even resurrection of the caliphate. Besides, what does ‘an Islamic reference’ in a civil state even mean? To him their discourse seems disingenuously vague.

Fr. Arsanius’ son was a revolutionary in Tahrir Square. There he rubbed shoulders with youthful members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of which seem to be in opposition to their leadership. Fr. Arsanius recognized this, and was hopeful the bonds created in Tahrir between Christians, Muslims, and even Islamists might hold true. Yet whatever the future portends, Fr. Arsanius notes the concerns of the present, tying them specifically to the Maghfara Mosque.

Over the years, it has not been uncommon for the imam to refer to Christians as kuffar, or infidels. During Muslim holidays they choose to pray outside, publically asserting their religious identity, filling the street in front of the church. When this falls on a Christian day of worship, usually one of the service times has to be cancelled since people cannot enter through the crowds. When I asked if he could introduce me to the imam, he politely declined. Though they are known to each other, Fr. Arsanius could not remember his name, but said the people of the mosque do not like America. How might they then interpret my effort, within their superficial relationship, to bring them an American?

At the heart of the Islamic religion, Fr. Arsanius declares, is the teaching to kill the non-Muslim. Oddly, this was the first comment he made as we opened our discussion. Thereafter, he proceeded to tell me about all the good relations notwithstanding.

When I asked him to explain this psychological tension in Coptic views toward their Muslim neighbors, he related the following anecdote. Last year, isolated criminal activity took place on the street in front of the church, and in the altercation the police officer assigned to guard the church shot and killed the perpetrator. Word spreads quickly in a traditional neighborhood such as Hadayak; the word which was spread, however, was that the ‘church guard’ shot and killed a Muslim. In no time at all, hundreds of neighborhood Muslims surrounded the church, perhaps seeking to burn it. Quickly the doorman closed the front gate, and other policemen came to investigate, eventually dismissing the crowd.

Were these hundreds representative of the thousands of Muslims in Hadayak, Fr. Arsanius asked rhetorically? No, we enjoy good relations with the Muslims of our area. Yet in an incident, when tensions are high along religious lines, there is an Islamic saying obliging Muslims to ‘support your brother, whether he is oppressed or oppressing’. Even if among a few, this spirit can overpower good relations.

There is tension permeating society, and the situation is fragile. Fr. Arsanius stated clearly that it is not appropriate for Copts to confront agitators head on, such as Salafi Muslims or the Muslim Brotherhood; this is not a Christian response, even if Copts appear to be increasingly adopting a confrontational stance, however non-violent. Yet he is not sure what the proper response is. How might love be extended to such as these? How might it be lived in relation to the Maghfara Mosque?

In any case, the church is committed to good relations, and Fr. Arsanius is confident these do exist. A sectarian incident is not likely to occur in Maadi. May his confidence be properly placed, both in God, and in the goodness of surrounding neighbors.

 

Note: It is my hope to visit also the imam of the Maghfara Mosque, and seek his perspective on community relations. I will write about this further following our discussion.

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Published in: on June 26, 2011 at 4:10 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Friday Prayers for Egypt

God,

There was much in the way of politics this week, and it is difficult to pray for politics. Like everywhere, politics is about wrangling, rhetoric, and the promotion of good through the lens of interest. If party to a position one can ask your favor; if not, wisdom can be sought for all.

Yet unique to Egypt is the newness of the experience. Politics here is not over this or that law, or this or that policy; it is more foundational. What type of government is best? Can the political ‘opponent’ be trusted? Who represents the popular will, and who betrays it? Who represents the revolutionary will, and who betrays it?

God, who can know? So much of this politics is projected populism, built on assumptions with no case history. The issues, God, are so important; but are they also trivial? Is it good that such divisions emerge among politicians, or is the fractured unity too much to bear?

God, some wish a return to basics. They call for an end to corruption, trials for former regime members, reform in the security services, and social justice to reach the poor. These believe that politics is distracting from the real issues.

God, who can know? There was clarity during the revolution, even if vision was short-term. Now, in seeking long-term structures, clarity has dissipated.

God, you know humanity, and you know what is best. Perhaps you have designed us so that wrangling, rhetoric, and the promotion of good through the lens of interest are exactly what moves society forward.

If so, make this process transparent. Make it clean and honest. May the best man win.

But in prayer, God, we return also to basics. Bless the leaders of Egypt; give them wisdom to conduct affairs of the nation well. Give the people of this land love for one another. Establish peace; protect security. Lift up the poor from their troubles, and lead those well-off to share.

God, bless Egypt. Have mercy on her, grant her grace, so that she may be strong according to your will. May this strength inhabit all citizens, and from humility, help them serve the common good.

Published in: on June 24, 2011 at 8:03 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Whose Wedding is it Anyway?

Last night Emma and Hannah were in their first Egyptian wedding as “ashbiinaat.”  This is basically the equivalent of the western “flower girl” or “ring bearer.”  I still can’t tell you the name of the bride or the groom, but I can tell you how it came about and how it played out.

About three weeks ago, one of the Sunday School teachers at the Arabic Evangelical Church of Maadi approached me to ask if Emma could be in the wedding of a fellow teacher.  She mentioned the name of the teacher, but said she wasn’t present that day so she couldn’t introduce me.  I told the teacher that I would ask Emma, but didn’t think she would want to be in the wedding as she had recently been saying she didn’t want to be in any weddings.  Both girls had preformed beautifully as flower girls in their Uncle Aaron’s wedding last fall, but Emma had decided she didn’t like the attention and chose not to be in any more weddings.  I promised the teacher I would talk about it with Emma, and as long as the white dress still fit from the previous wedding, I had no objection to her taking part.

Emma surprised me by quickly agreeing to be in this wedding and once we tried on the dress and learned that both hers and Hannah’s still fit, I took that information to the teacher the following week at Sunday School.  I cautioned that while Emma agreed, she may change her mind under pressure as everyone is staring at her, taking pictures and getting in her face.  I suggested that if there was trouble, maybe Hannah could join her at that moment and it might make Emma feel more comfortable.  I really wasn’t trying to push for Hannah to be in the wedding, but who knows how they understood it.  In any case, she came back to me a few minutes later, after talking with the bride, and they wanted both girls to now be in the wedding.  At this point I got to meet the bride, who I kind of recognized as one of the teachers, but I can’t remember her name now.  I still don’t really know why she asked Emma to be in the wedding, as she has no relationship with her; I can only assume she wanted a cute foreign kid in her wedding.  And now she had two!

The wedding took place on Sunday night, the day after our enjoyable, yet long, rihla to Anafora.  The girls had both gone to preschool that day, then had lunch, then Emma did her homework, and then they played outside a bit before it was time for dinner and getting in their white dresses.  Both girls were excited about their role and telling our neighbors all about it.  The wedding was supposed to start at 6:00, and we were told to arrive between 5:30 and 5:45.  Being the punctual foreigners, we ate dinner, dressed the girls, combed their hair, and hopped in a taxi, arriving at the church around 5:35.  The florists were there decorating the church and the videographer and photographer looked to be present, but there wasn’t any sign of anyone else, let alone the organizers.  I had the girls sit down on the white aisle runner and snapped a few pictures before anyone arrived.

And then we waited, and waited, and waited.  People very slowly started arriving, and Emma and Hannah danced around outside as Layla toddled around inside the church.  As it got closer to 6:00, and it became obvious that this was not going to start on time, Jayson and I wondered about allowing our girls to be in weddings of people we don’t know.  It’s one thing to do this for friends or acquaintances, but strangers?

As we waited for more people to come, we watched the road for signs of the bride’s car.  Emma and Hannah practiced their Egyptian wedding call, which is called the “zigruut.”  It involves moving your tongue back and forth inside your mouth very rapidly while making noise. I’m sure they will be experts at this by the time they are 8, if not earlier.

You may notice that Emma and Hannah have their hair in pigtails.  Perhaps this isn’t the dressiest thing to do with hair, but I am not the best when it comes to styling hair.  Also, the girls’ hair is fine and light so   I don’t feel like there is much I can do with it.  So, for something different, I put it in pigtails.  This is their last picture in pigtails, because when the bridesmaid, Miss Mary, arrived, she asked me to let their hair down.  Emma’s worked okay, despite the fact that I had no comb with me.  But poor Hannah has very little hair in the back, and once it is in pigtails, it keeps that shape for a long time!

It was about 5:50 when Miss Mary arrived and explained to the girls exactly how to walk with her.  It turns out there were other children in the wedding as well, and they would all walk in formation with the one bridesmaid who would be accompanying the bride from the car, up the stairs, and into the church.  Once they got into the church, the role of the children was over.

As we waited for the bride to arrive, the many children who were attending the event, posed for pictures with some of the Sunday school teachers who were also present.

And then, finally, we heard the familiar “honk—honk—honk-honk-honk” of the bride’s car as it approached the front of the church.

The kids lined up with Miss Mary to welcome the bride.

Emma had told me she would smile nicely for the wedding, and I especially notice it in this picture as that is not her natural look.  I also notice that this is when Hannah really started to fade.  Due to the long trip the previous day, she was wiped out and ready for bed already.  She did make it all the way to the inside of the church, but just barely.

As the bride exited the car, led by her father, I barely recognized her as the woman I spoke with two weeks prior.  For one, her hair had been brown, and she wore glasses.  The amount of make-up was quite different from her normal look as well.  This is all to be expected on the wedding day, but the change of hair color really threw me.  The kids lined up in front of the bride, ready to lead her up the stairs.  All the guests surrounded the procession and the big mob moved into the back of the sanctuary.

At this point, Miss Mary and the kids stopped as the bride and groom continued to the front stage.  Emma and Hannah came back to me and they were free to do as they pleased.  Hannah, who was very tired, chose to sit with us, which quickly turned to lying down on a pew.  Emma, who was still excited about the whole wedding thing, wanted to sit in the front where she could see better.  I let her go, figuring she would behave well.  I also realized that these weddings are different from our traditional western weddings where the wedding party and pastor may be on stage, but everyone else is sitting in the pews.  Perhaps the photographer or videographer move about inconspicuously, but as much as possible, no one blocks the view of the bride.  You may be able to see from this picture that these events are much more informal as some gather as close to the stage as they can.  Also, the pictures and video of the wedding is of utmost importance, and the professionals do not need to stay out of sight.

Among the crowd, the groom is standing on the right edge of the photo, and the bride is next to him, outside the frame.

Emma spent most of the ceremony as close as she could to the bride.  At one point, Jayson went to the front to take pictures and told me she was standing next to the iconostasis.  I couldn’t believe she felt comfortable up front and center where all the attention was focused.  Perhaps because it was her choice to be there, she felt okay.  I also wondered if it was okay with the bride that Emma was right next to her.  I was told later that it was no problem.

Around 6:30, Jayson took Hannah home to put her to bed, and I pushed Layla around the church in the stroller to keep her content.  Emma came to the back of the church about 5 minutes before the ceremony ended and told me that she now wanted to play outside, as many of the other kids were doing.  She also wanted chips like the other kids.  So, we took one last picture with three of her teachers (at top of post) and bought a bag of chips for the taxi ride home.  She had done a great job in performing her duty, and even enjoyed a close-up view of the ceremony.  Now it was time to have a snack and get home to bed as she returned to being a normal schoolgirl the next morning.  Maybe one day we will learn the names of the bride and groom, but until then, we’ll be thankful it was a good experience for our girls.

Published in: on June 21, 2011 at 5:28 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Sympathy for Islamists

Translation: Against Torture

While Egypt is currently soul searching about its coming political identity, with Islamist governance among the many possible democratic choices, it is good to remember the suffering endured by these groups over the past several decades. The following excerpts are not meant to offer support for the Islamist cause, nor to deny that numbers of Islamists engaged in terrorist or violent revolutionary activity. Rather, it is an attempt to highlight the humanity of these individuals, especially in reference to the operations of state which dehumanized them.

The first selection concerns Kamal Habib, an active Egyptian jihadist from the 1970s. The excerpt comes from ‘Journey of the Jihadist’, by Fawaz Gerges. When asked, “Isn’t jihad by its very nature revolutionary rather than peaceful?” he replied:

We did not fire the first round in this battle. The rulers had closed all avenues for a peaceful transfer of power. We had no choice but to take up arms to raise Islam’s banner. The fight was imposed on us.

… Some of us arrived at different conclusions as to what could and should be done to resist aggression against our Islamic identity. The prison years also radicalized [the youth] and set them on another violent journey. The torture left deep physical and psychological scars on jihadists and fueled their thirst for vengeance.

Look at my hands – still spotted with the scars from cigarette burns nineteen years later. For days on end we were brutalized – our faces bloodied, our bodies broken with electrical shocks and other devices. The torturers aimed at breaking our souls and brainwashing us. They wanted to humiliate us and force us to betray the closest members of our cells. I spent sleepless nights listening to the screams of young men echoing from the torture chambers.

A degrading, dehumanizing experience. I cannot convey to you the rage felt by [the youth] who were tortured after Sadat’s assassination. Some left the prisons and the country determined to exact revenge on their tormentors and torturers. The authorities’ brutal methods nourished fanaticism and sowed the seeds for more violence and bloodshed.

Since the revolution, Kamal Habib is still prominent among his group, Islamic Jihad, which has abandoned violence and is seeking to form a political party. Among his recent statements has been a call to eliminate all foreign universities in Egypt, since they work against the development of Islamic thought.

The second selection is more recent, concerning the case of Adel Futuh Ali al-Gazzar, who was arrested following his return to Egypt after having been interred at Guantanamo Bay. The excerpt comes from al-Masry al-Youm, an Egyptian daily newspaper with an online English component.

Gazzar was picked up by US forces while working for the Red Crescent [the equivalent of the Red Cross in Islamic countries] in Afghanistan. He was transferred to a US prison facility in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, and other forms of torture, according to Reprieve, a UK advocacy group for prisoners’ rights. During this time, Gazzar lost his leg, which had been injured in a US bombing raid, due to lack of medical treatment.

He was then sent to the United States’ Guantanamo prison for terrorism suspects where he was held incommunicado for nine years. The Guantanamo bay prison camp has been widely condemned by US and international human rights organizations.

In 2010 the US government cleared Gazzar of the charges against him and released him to Slovakia. He was not repatriated to Egypt out of fear that he would be tortured.

According to the article, Gazzar had been convicted by an Egyptian court in absentia in 2001, concerning involvement in a plot to overthrow Mubarak. He was arrested at the airport so that the government would be able to assess his current legal status.

There is a current sentiment which imagines groups like the Muslim Brotherhood enjoy favor in post-revolutionary Egypt because they are best placed to both appeal to the masses on the basis of religion and secure the stability of middle and upper class economic interests. It is true that many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are businessmen of means. It is also true that many in Egypt accuse them of playing with religion in order to make money.

Yet like the Islamists described above, they have also suffered. Even though their political opposition was not violent, many, if not most, have spent time in prison. As such, an understandable premise is that Islamists have not accepted the fact of their oppression simply to make money. This would suggest that the above sentiment is wrong. It would suggest they have their eyes on full transformation of society, which would include a reshaping of the political system, with themselves, and those of like mind, the principle shapers.

If this interpretation would turn pragmatic and callous, it might suggest that such severe repression was necessary to keep their vision from being implemented, and might be necessary still. If it would turn cynical it might suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood should not be trusted when they make promises of sharing power; this could be a temporary measure in preparation for their ultimate designs. If it were to turn hopeful, it might suggest that having suffered, they would be loathe to inflict others with the same fate, and may indeed craft a system of governance resonant with Egyptian religious realities.

I do not mean to state I have a feel for which of these suggestions is closest to reality. Rather, I hope these portions serve only to lend a level of appreciation for the Islamists of Egypt. By all appearances, though appearances can be deceiving, they have suffered for what they believe in. While the power of conviction may make them dangerous, it also makes them worthy of respect.

Other articles and analysis may suggest ways in which they have manipulated, compromised, and disassembled throughout the years. For these, respect may possibly be withdrawn. Yet no man undergoes torture for only his self-interest. Suffering under conviction makes possible a wide and idealistic following. While this following should not be overestimated, neither should it be dismissed. If they are opposed out of fear, fear will bend before their courage. If they are engaged from appreciation, love is able to trump courage. It will do so in humility, weighing the worth of their convictions. Some may wither, others may remain.

Little else, and certainly not brute power, can challenge such powerful example.

Published in: on June 19, 2011 at 1:32 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Friday Prayers for Egypt

God,

Give Egypt a good president, a good parliament, and a good constitution. Give her the wisdom to know in which order to start. So many are divided on this matter, and it is of utmost importance for the future of the country. Personal interests, party politics, and popular sovereignty all confuse the issue concerning what is best for Egypt. Yet this is exactly what we ask: Good men in all these roles, serving a good document built on national consensus.

Guide Egypt, God, to such consensus; raise up the men and women who can lead her there.

God, give Egypt security. Thank you for progress made. Hundreds of criminals have been arrested. Alleged terrorists have been apprehended returning from abroad. Prosecution has begun for those accused of sectarian attacks. Citizen groups are partnering with police. Yet thousands of criminals are still at large, and accusations of police brutality linger. Egypt has much to change from its previous policy; much to rebuild following the revolution.  

God, help her to do so. May the people live in peace, secure in the rule of law, consciously applied.

God, thank you for all that has taken place, both the good and the bad. May people trust your sovereignty, and confidently work on behalf of greater principles. Honor the many good people here, God, who wish the best for their nation. Rebuke, forgive, and guide those who mix their efforts with private gains or narrow interests.

God, give wisdom to Egyptians, to the coming electorate, to be able to tell the difference between them.

Amen.

Published in: on June 17, 2011 at 8:32 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Total Lunar Eclipse in Egypt

Today we witnessed the lunar eclipse, standing on a bridge over the Cairo metro, just a two minute walk from our home. Here are two pictures:

Scientists say lunar eclipses occur two to four times per year, but they are not visible everywhere. On this occasion, the Middle East was a beneficiary, while North America missed out. The red color is due to the red portion of the color spectrum bending around the Earth at the correct angle to highlight the moon. Look elsewhere for a better scientific explanation, though, we just enjoyed the view.

Our pictures are from about 45 minutes before the peak of the total eclipse, making the moon appear as if a bit has been taken out of it. At the peak time the moon was fully red, but from our angle it was too dark to capture in a photograph. Alas.

Published in: on June 15, 2011 at 8:52 pm  Comments (1)  
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party: First Conference and Key Questions

The speakers' platform. Dr. al-Erian is seated in the middle.

Dr. Essam al-Erian, vice-president for the Muslim Brotherhood established Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), officially commenced party activity in a conference in Shubra, Cairo. The location was specifically chosen, he stated, due to the fact it was an area long neglected and marginalized by the former regime. The FJP wishes to see Egypt become completely independent of all foreign powers, especially economically, so that all, especially the poor, may benefit.

Also in attendance were Dr. Mohamed al-Beltagi and Mr. Gamal Shehata of the Muslim Brotherhood, each of whom also gave speeches. They were joined by the Egyptian poet Mohamed Goudah and artist Wagih al-Arabi, as well as Dr. Duaa’ Maghazi, a Muslim sister. Dr. Rafik Habib, the Egyptian Christian researcher and vice-president of the FJP was listed among the presenters, but was not in attendance.

Dr. Mohamed al-Beltagi

Al-Erian railed against the long scope of foreign interference in the Egyptian economy, stretching back to the British occupation, the monastic period of King Farouk, the Free Officers led by President Jamal Abdel Nasser, and culminating in President Mubarak. Each allowed foreign powers to profit off the Egyptian people. Al-Erian insisted that any current loans accepted by the Egyptian state must be completely absent of conditions.

Al-Erian was also critical of the current security situation in Egypt. He made a parallel to the failures of officers in 1973, during which their ranks were purged to remove incapable or corrupt figures. He wondered why this has not yet been done among police following the revolution, when many have been involved in torture and used live ammunition against protestors.

Yet while he was critical of the police, al-Erian offered praise and thanks to the military. First and foremost this was for their role in protecting the people during the revolution, contrary to their orders to fire upon them. He also praised the army for its promise to surrender authority to a civilian, elected government, and awaited its fulfillment in time, with full confidence.

At the same time, al-Erian denied there was an agreement between the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the Muslim Brotherhood, stating the FJP would not hesitate to criticize the military if it diverged from its revolutionary mandate. So far, however, their mistakes have been minor.

Speaking to the fears of an Islamist dominated government, al-Erian stated the FJP was not looking for a parliamentary majority. In fact, the party aim is to capture between 30-35% of the seats. Recalling cooperation during the revolution, he stated that the Muslim Brotherhood, nor any other group, would have been able to overthrow Mubarak on its own. The common interests of all political parties are substantial, and they should work together to craft a national unity government. The political system needs strong and diverse parties, reiterating the FJP desires a civil state based on the law.

Dr. al-Erian

Al-Erian spoke briefly about foreign policy, urging the United States to withdraw from Afghanistan, and NATO to cease operations in Libya. The Libyan people are capable to rid themselves of Gaddafi on their own, and NATO strikes only serve to demolish the country and its infrastructure.

Al-Erian closed by assuring the audience the FJP, due to the skills gained by the Muslim Brotherhood, was capable to undertake its political responsibilities and participate in rebuilding Egypt. The party welcomed all in this task, Muslims and Christians, men and women, workers and farmers, the young and the old. Furthermore, it was dedicated to serving the interests of this entire constituency.

There were approximately 800-1000 people in attendance, seated in a tent erected in a central square of Shubra under the evening sky. Most people appeared to be of lower middle class economic status.

While no space was given for questions and answers, in subsequent research we would like to probe further the relationships between the Freedom and Justice Party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Salafi movement. Specifically:

  • What is the relationship between the FJP and the Brotherhood? According to reports it is to be independent in administration and finance, yet its leaders are all Brotherhood veterans, appointed by the group. How will the political party function in practice?
  • What is the role of the FJP headquarters in Manial, Cairo? By appearance this is a small office on the 3rd floor of a nondescript building. Yet inside was a caretaker, with his bed set up near the conference table, with a direct line to al-Erian. The Muslim Brotherhood headquarters, meanwhile, are an impressive stand alone multi-story building recently constructed on a major road in Muqattam, Cairo. Does this suggest a practical subjection of party to greater Brotherhood leadership?
  • To what degree does the FJP include Muslim Brotherhood youth? These are depicted in the media of having disagreements with the traditional Brotherhood leadership. Is this a reality?
  • What is the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas? Several years ago al-Erian was heavily involved in supplying Gaza with medical supplies through the doctors’ syndicate, utilizing Hamas connections.[1] Do official links between the movements exist? Is their coordination or funding involved? However sympathetic with the plight of Gaza, does the Muslim Brotherhood approve of Hamas’ tactics?
  •  What relationships exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military council? Through personal conversations between Cornelis Hulsman and Osama Farid, a Muslim Brotherhood senior figure, the group maintains a direct line with senior military officers. What is the extent of their communication? Does it differ from that between the military council and other political or social groups?
  • What links exist between the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups? Will there be political cooperation between the FJP and Salafi parties? Some Brotherhood members have criticized the Salafis, while others have hosted conferences between the two groups. Is there an official stance?
  • What are the different trends among Salafis, who generally are not an organized presence in society? What are their methods of propagation? From where does their funding originate? Do they serve foreign or transnational agendas? Does the Muslim Brotherhood?

Many people, both in Egypt and the west, are asking these questions right now. While both the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood are working hard to demonstrate they are a moderate, centrist political and social force, their answers to questions like these will go a long way in demonstrating their credibility.

One final note concerning the historical reality of the Muslim Brotherhood, highlighted by Badran, a resident of Shubra and a Brotherhood supporter: in 1948 the Muslim Brotherhood first began conversations with the Egyptian armed forces, which were repeated in 1952. This opened the political space for them, but by 1954 they suffered repression. In 1970 President Sadat, a military official, once again engaged the Muslim Brotherhood, giving wide space for operation, but by 1980 began repression once again.

This pattern is undoubtedly known and feared by the Muslim Brotherhood. Regardless of conspiracy theories which posit military favor for the group, it is certain that once again the Brotherhood has approval to operate openly. This may be one reason behind the constant reassertions of their civil, democratic, moderate intentions. If true, there is no need for repression. Yet it may be asked if they also wonder if their window of opportunity is now open, and that they intend to consolidate power before they are repressed once again.

The political future of Egypt is wide open. May all participants operate from integrity and concern for the nation. The short term horizon will be very interesting, and perhaps foundational. May peace, stability, freedom, and justice mark what is to come, Islamist or otherwise.

 

[1] From a personal conversation several years ago between al-Erian and Cornelis Hulsman, editor-in-chief of Arab West Report.

 

Published in: on June 12, 2011 at 8:38 pm  Leave a Comment  
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Conventional Wisdom and the Muslim Brotherhood

Logo Muslim Brotherhood

Muslim Brotherhood Logo

In the early days of the Egyptian revolution, one of the significant fears, especially in the West, was that a transition to democratic rule would usher in an Islamic government headed by the Muslim Brotherhood. This has since been established as the conventional wisdom, even in Egypt. Liberal groups urge postponing anticipated September parliamentary elections, in order to gain more time to form viable political parties able to compete with the newly created and Brotherhood-backed Freedom and Justice Party.

Conventional wisdom was established following the results of the March 19 popular referendum on amendments to the Egyptian constitution. A yes vote was the adopted position by Islamist groups, many of which portrayed the effort as a defense of religion. They won overwhelmingly, with 77% of the vote, in unprecedented 40% voter turnout.

Yet in recent days there have been a few contrarian indicators concerning widespread popular support for the Brotherhood. Gallop conducted a poll in which only 15% said they support the group. The poll does match the uncertain and contradictory state of Egyptian politics, however, for although only 1% support a theocracy, 69% believe religious leaders should have an advisory role in legislation. Depending on how campaign rhetoric is spun, the population may vote Islamist out of fear from godless liberals, or else run screaming out of fear of becoming a new Iran. Yet in terms of tangible support, if the poll is accurate, the Muslim Brotherhood is not inherently perched to assume political power.

Part of the assumption of Brotherhood popularity is built upon their reputation of providing support to the poor in social services. This is true from their inception, and in the 1940s they built a wide network of service provision throughout rural and urban Egypt. Yet in the more recent decades under Mubarak in which the Brotherhood was an outlawed, though tolerated, social presence and the only semi-legitimate opposition political force, measuring and verifying their welfare reach became more difficult. Nevertheless, the assumption remained.

This assumption has been challenged in research conducted by Daniella Pioppi. She argues:

The Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities after the Nasser parenthesis have never reached the levels of diffusion and organization of the 1930s and 1940s. Furthermore, they are generally aimed at the middle to upper classes rather than the most disadvantaged social strata. Since the repression cycle that started in the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood’s social activities have been drastically reduced and do not seem to play a significant role in popular mobilization, not least for lack of a clear political and social project.

Her paper, and others, can be found here.

Excepting the previously stated referendum, Egypt has not had open, democratic elections for over fifty years. In the absence of criteria by which to judge, it is nearly impossible to forecast the electoral choices of over 80 million Egyptians, most of whom have been depoliticized their entire life. Will the ‘uneducated, religious masses’ be swayed to vote Islamist, believing this to be a vote for God? Will the ‘taste of freedom and liberty’ make them forswear the Muslim Brotherhood, widely known as an authoritarian organization in its own right? No one knows. Neither the Gallop poll, nor the referendum should be taken as an accurate gauge of political currents.

Politics is always full of surprises. In all likelihood, an unfettered election process will produce nothing less, no matter what the end result may be.

Published in: on June 11, 2011 at 7:21 pm  Leave a Comment  
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